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Direct and Indirect Effects of Internal Control Weaknesses on Accrual Quality: Evidence 
from a Unique Canadian Regulatory Setting 
 
ABSTRACT 
Public disclosure about effectiveness of internal control systems is subject to much controversy in 
Canada, resulting in Canadian disclosures being made in Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A).  
These disclosures are provided to investors without a definition of the weaknesses to be reported, without 
implementation effectiveness testing, no direct management certification and no external audit of such 
disclosures. Though the cost of such SOX North disclosures are lower than in the U.S. setting, the 
credibility of these disclosures is far from assured, posing an important empirical issue for regulators 
interested in the cost versus benefit trade-off of various disclosure regimes. We use OLS regression and 
path analysis embedded in a structural model to examine the association between the strength of internal 
control and accrual quality in order to infer whether these disclosures are credible. The OLS regression 
finding of an overall negative net effect of internal control weaknesses on accrual quality is refined by 
recursive path analysis which shows that this overall negative effect is composed of a large negative 
direct effect of weaknesses on accrual quality and a smaller offsetting positive indirect effect of 
weaknesses on accrual quality via increased audit effort.  The modest substitution effect implies that 
auditors cannot fully compensate for poor internal control by increased substantive work, which is per se 
evidence justifying some form of internal control disclosures for investors. Overall, our results suggest 
that lower cost SOX North disclosures are credible. This informs the cost-benefit debate facing regulators 
around the globe seeking alternatives to the costly U.S. model of internal control reporting.   
 
JEL Classifications: G38, M41, M42 
Key Words: Internal Control, Auditing, Accrual Quality, Regulation 
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Direct and Indirect Effects of Internal Control Weaknesses on Accrual Quality: Evidence 
from a Unique Canadian Regulatory Setting 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
In this study we examine the effectiveness of a unique Canadian disclosure approach regarding 
the adequacy of a firm’s internal control over financial reporting (ICOFR). According to this approach, 
the disclosures of internal control design weaknesses are contained in the “Management Discussion and 
Analysis” (MD&A).  These disclosures are neither certified by management (Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 
(SOX) 302 or SOX 404 Part (a)) nor audited by the external auditor (SOX 404 Part (b)).  Further, they are 
not accompanied by implementation effectiveness tests, which were viewed as being the more costly 
activity in making the disclosure (Roberts and Beal 2005). Thus, the Canadian provisions are much less 
costly than equivalent SOX provisions.  
Some observers cite the rising costs of compliance with SOX as one reason European companies 
are delisting from U.S. exchanges in increasing numbers.1
Issues related to costs have been at the heart of the U.S. debate since the passage of SOX in 2002, 
especially regarding the alleged disproportionate costs on smaller public companies that are above the 
minimum market capitalization requiring full SOX disclosure, that is, accelerated filers (see Hoitash, 
Hoitash and Bedard 2008, 2009; Kinney and Shepardson 2010).  Since 2007, even non-accelerated filers 
have had to report under SOX 404 Part (a) which requires separate management certification of the results 
of an assessment of internal control design and implementation effectiveness.  Further,  it appears that the 
June 15, 2010 deadline for smaller US non-accelerated files is the last deferral the US Securities and 
 Regulators in many countries outside the U.S. 
are improving their country’s governance and listing standards and are seeking alternatives to the costly 
U.S. model of corporate governance, especially with respect to internal controls. Our study informs this 
cost-benefit debate by providing evidence from the lower compliance cost setting in Canada. 
                                                             
1 See Wall Street Journal (Europe) article “Symbolic shift grows” on May 18, 2010. Piotroski and Srinivasan (2008) 
also find the incremental costs associated with SOX compliance affect the listing decision of small foreign firms. 
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Exchange Commission (SEC) will grant for the SOX 404 Part (b) auditor attestation requirement for non-
accelerated filers (SEC Release Number 33-9072, 34-60813), despite the added costs of compliance.  
 SOX North (as we call the Canadian approach) compliance costs related to internal control 
weakness disclosures are designed to be lower than SOX 404 costs and, at least in the period 2006-2008, 
to be lower than they are for non-accelerated filers in the U.S. under SOX 404 Part (a) (Roberts and Beal 
2005). Given this low cost Canadian setting, and following the classic  disclosure argument that low cost 
signals are not credible (e.g., Spence 1973; Ross 1977; Comment and Jarrell 1991), the crucial research 
question we address is whether these self-reported disclosures in  MD&A are  credible.  In the U.S. 
setting, prior studies find that disclosed internal control weaknesses affect accrual quality (e.g., Doyle, Ge 
and McVay 2007a), suggesting that such disclosures are credible. However, it is not obvious that SOX 
North disclosures will be credible given their low cost nature. Hence, our first research question is: “Are 
Canadian internal control design weakness disclosures credible?” Specifically, we examine the 
association between Canadian internal control design weaknesses disclosures and accrual quality. A 
negative association provides evidence that there exists an alternative regulatory regime, SOX North, that 
provides credible information to users yet is less costly than the SOX 404 regime.   
Simunic (1980) and Griffin, Lont and Sun (2008) argue that a firm can achieve a planned accrual 
quality level by substituting more external audit effort for weak internal control. Prior studies have 
ignored the substitution effect of external monitoring for internal control strength when testing for an 
association between internal control disclosures and accrual quality (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, 
Kinney, and LaFond 2008; Doyle et al. 2007a; Raghunanda and Rama 2006). Given the lack of credibility 
enhancement mechanisms in the Canadian setting, the researcher employing a single equation OLS test of 
association could potentially observe a weakened or no association between internal control weaknesses 
and accrual quality due to this substitution effect. Since such a null result could arise either from no 
credibility or complete audit effort substitution inferences arising from that finding would be problematic.  
Thus, our second research question is: “Does external monitoring compensate for the impact of internal 
control weakness on accrual quality?” In other words, is there a direct effect from internal control 
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weaknesses to accrual quality, offset by an indirect effect from internal control weaknesses to accrual 
quality via audit effort? Either observed path result would lead us to conclude that the disclosures are 
credible, our key research focus. 
We employ a multi-method research approach to investigate these issues. First, we employ OLS 
and two-stage regressions to examine the association between disclosed internal control weaknesses and 
accrual quality.  This provides evidence comparable to Doyle et al. (2007a) as to whether Canadian 
internal control design weakness disclosures are considered credible.  Second, we employ path analysis 
embedded in a structural model in a recursive (unidirectional) setting where auditors are assumed to make 
the decision on financial statement audit effort after observing the quality of internal control. This allows 
us to test for direct and indirect effects of internal control strength on accrual quality.  Finally, as a 
robustness check, we allow for endogeneity among the three variables by conducting non-recursive 
(bidirectional) path analysis. This approach assumes that audit effort, internal control strength and accrual 
quality are jointly and simultaneously determined in anticipation of the audit of financial statement 
occurring and the need to make the required disclosures.  
Our main accrual quality measure is based on Dechow and Dichev (2002), with absolute 
unexplained accruals representing the inverse of quality.  We also test the robustness of our conclusions 
using the Ball and Shivakumar (2006) modified Dechow and Dichev measure.2
                                                             
2 In this measure, we address the non-linearity concern raised in Ball and Shivakumar (2006).  We also tested but do 
not tabulate results employing a wide variety of accruals models and their resultant accrual quality measures, 
including several variants of the Jones model. We found generally consistent results with our two main Dechow and 
Dichev measures.  Extant research (e.g., Kinney and Shepardson 2010 and Dhaliwal, Naiker and Navissi 2010) uses 
the Dechow and Dichev accruals model. 
 Our regression analysis 
reveals an overall positive association between disclosed internal control weaknesses and unsigned 
unexplained accruals. This establishes the credibility of Canadian internal control disclosures and 
replicates findings in the much costlier and more monitored U.S. setting.  Our recursive (unidirectional) 
path analysis further shows that the overall positive effect is composed of a large direct positive effect of 
internal control weaknesses on unsigned unexplained accruals and a smaller indirect negative effect of 
internal control weaknesses on unsigned unexplained accruals via external audit effort.  The direct effect 
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suggests that the internal control weakness disclosures of Canadian firms are credible, consistent with the 
view of Canadian regulators and contrary to those who advocate the need for audited disclosures (e.g., 
Salterio 2006). The indirect negative effect also implies disclosure credibility. It suggests that there is a 
substitution effect (i.e. weaker internal controls are associated with more audit effort that results in higher 
accruals quality) but that substitution is both limited and incomplete, albeit statistically significant.  
The study is different from the related studies in literature and provides policy implications. Given 
the lack of definitions about what constituted a weakness and what had to be disclosed, no management 
certification, no control implementation testing and no external audit requirements for these disclosures, 
whether SOX North leads to credible disclosures cannot be inferred directly from the findings in the 
studies based on U.S. data.  This is important to study given the lower costs of the SOX North approach 
and a worldwide interest in more cost effective approaches to internal control reporting than the SOX 
model.  
A more subtle contribution relates to the role of auditors in compensating for internal control 
weaknesses through increased substantive testing. Using U.S. data, Doyle et al. (2007a) show that there 
are a larger number of account-specific (i.e., auditable) weaknesses under SOX 404 than 302 and that the 
negative association only exists between less auditable design weaknesses and accrual quality. Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al. (2008) examine a sample with both SOX 302 and 404 disclosures and show, in the levels, 
that firms reporting internal control deficiencies (versus none) have lower accrual quality.  They observe 
that firms whose auditors confirm remediation of previously reported internal control deficiencies 
experience an increase in accrual quality. Both studies imply the important role of external auditors in 
mitigating the impact of internal control weaknesses on accrual quality but neither one explicitly 
examines this mitigating effect. In this study, we use path analysis to decompose the direct and indirect 
effects of internal control weaknesses on accrual quality. This is an important extension.  The advantage 
to decomposing direct and indirect effects is that the direct effect captures the potentially harmful impact 
of internal control weaknesses on accrual quality. The indirect effect suggests the extent external auditors 
currently reduce the negative effect of internal control weakness on accrual quality via enhanced external 
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monitoring. We show that such substitution effects are small, implying that auditors cannot fully 
compensate for poorly designed internal controls by increased substantive work. This constitutes per se 
evidence justifying some form of internal control disclosures for investors. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes institutional background 
and hypotheses. Section 3 discusses our sample data and descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents our 
regression-based tests and the results. Section 5 discusses our recursive path analysis embedded in a 
structural equations model and the results.  Section 6 presents a path analysis which allows for 
endogeneity in addition to other robustness checks. Section 7 concludes the paper with implications, 
limitations and suggestions for future research. 
  
2.  Institutional background and hypotheses 
Institutional background 
Canada has ten provincial securities regulators plus three territorial regulators, of which four have 
the potential to have significant capital markets regulatory impact as the vast majority of registrants are 
domiciled in these jurisdictions (Alberta, British Columbia, Ontario and Quebec) and they invest in staff 
somewhat commensurate with their responsibilities. Collectively, these provincial and territorial securities 
regulators call themselves the “Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA).” The CSA has no decision 
making ability itself as Canada does not have a national securities regulator and all proposed regulations 
must be individually passed in each jurisdiction. In June 2003, the CSA originally proposed that 
management assess and test the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting effective 2005.  
The 2003 proposal sounded somewhat similar to SOX 302, but even the original proposal 
provided for the ICOFR disclosures to  be located in the Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) 
section of the annual report (CSA 2005a, 2008). However, the CSA could not obtain the needed 
unanimous agreement since the British Columbia Securities Commission (BCSC) dissented (Salterio and 
Schmidt 2007). In September 2005, the BCSC agreed to ICOFR disclosure requirements, subject to such 
requirements being implemented in two phases in order to reduce compliance costs. The first stage, from 
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2006 to 2008, featured an internal control system design effectiveness evaluation (CSA 2005a).  At that 
time, the details of implementation effectiveness testing requirements, to be required starting in 2008, 
were left for further negotiation (CSA 2008).   
The final Canadian rule (known as 52-109) featured management signing a declaration  that they 
had “designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused it to be designed under our 
supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the 
preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with the issuer’s GAAP” (CSA 
2005b).  This declaration was filed with the securities commission and did not accompany the actual 
disclosures in the MD&A. In contrast, the SOX 302 certification states that the “certifying officers … 
have disclosed … based on our most recent evaluation … all significant deficiencies in the design or 
operation of internal controls … including any material weaknesses in internal controls …” (SEC 2002) 
and it accompanied the disclosures in the same report.  In other words, under the Canadian regulation, 
there was no requirement for managers to certify they had discovered and disclosed any weaknesses 
(CSA 2005a). Indeed, the Canadian regulation had no mention of the term “weakness” in it and no 
provisions for certifying anything other than what is stated above (CSA 2005b). See Example 1 in 
Appendix 1 for what we found to be an example of a “best practice” disclosure.  
CSA Staff Notice (CSA 2006a), issued in late September 2006, clarified regulatory staff views 
about when and if such assessments needed to be disclosed:  
Certifying officers should cause the issuer to disclose in the annual MD&A the nature of any 
weakness in the design of the issuer’s ICOFR, the risks associated with the weakness and the 
issuer’s plan, if any, to remediate the weakness. If no such plan exists, the issuer should consider 
disclosing its reasons for not planning to remediate the weakness. 
This Staff Notice established the requirement, at least from a CSA staff perspective, to disclose 
weaknesses but without any definition about what weaknesses should be reported.  On this issue, 
Goodfellow and Willis (2006, p. 40) characterize the conclusion of the Big 4 accounting firms and the 
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) as follows:   
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The U.S. test of “more than a remote likelihood of a material misstatement” ...  needs to be 
considered since it could be used ... in the absence of a Canadian definition or authoritative 
guidance.   
Further, the CICA’s Risk Management and Governance Committee, which provides non-
authoritative guidance on governance best practices, states in its publication about board of directors’ 
oversight of MD&A for 2007 disclosures (Willis 2008 p.7): 
Management of non-venture issuers may also have to make judgments about the materiality of 
weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting and the need to include control-related 
disclosures in the MD&A, as required under the CSA’s regulations related to the CEO’s and 
CFO’s certification of the annual and interim filings.   
Example 2 in Appendix 1 provides a disclosure made by a company of weaknesses in internal 
controls over financial reporting.  Table 1 provides a summary of the similarities and differences between 
the U.S. SOX regime and the Canadian setting.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Thus, fully compliant disclosure of internal control design weaknesses is not assured for at least 
three reasons.  First, there is a lack of a definition in the regulation and the follow up staff notice as to 
what weaknesses merit disclosure.  Second, weaker incentives exist for truthful reporting due to the lack 
of accountability and other credibility enhancement mechanisms (no direct management certification and 
no external audit of such disclosures).  Third, by focusing on design effectiveness for the period under 
study and not testing implementation, design weaknesses may not be as readily identified as it is often 
during implementation tests of controls that design weaknesses become apparent.   
These features make Canadian disclosures different from those disclosures under SOX 302, in 
which internal control weaknesses are well defined and implementation tests are required.  As indicated in 
Table 1, the CSA added in 2008 the requirement for implementation tests and management certification 
of all disclosures about internal control (see KPMG 2008 for a summary of the reaction to this change). 
Thus, the credibility of 2006 Canadian internal control disclosures is far from assured.   
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Hypothesis development 
Numerous prior studies have examined the factors affecting accrual quality. Poor accrual quality 
can be attributed to unintentional errors and intentional biases. Dechow and Dichev (2002) measure 
accrual quality by the extent to which current accruals map into past, current, and future cash flows. 
Various measures based on the Dechow and Dichev model have been adopted to examine the quality of 
financial reporting. Doyle et al. (2007a) hypothesize and find that internal control weaknesses are 
negatively associated with accrual quality after controlling for firm characteristics such as volatility of 
cash flows and sales, total assets, loss provision, business complexity, and operating cycles. They follow 
the logical development that a weak system of internal controls leads to an increased risk of intentional 
and unintentional errors in financial accounting and that such errors will be reflected in the quality of 
accounting accruals. If the Canadian disclosures are credible, the same results should be obtained here. 
Hence, we have our first hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS 1: The greater the number of internal control weaknesses reported by Canadian public 
companies in their MD&A, the lower the accrual quality.  
 The null of Hypothesis 1 (H1) would occur if internal control design weaknesses lack credibility 
due to the institutional features discussed above. Re-stating the hypotheses in terms of unsigned 
unexplained accruals, our proxy for accrual quality, H1 
An alternative explanation for finding no effect of internal control weakness disclosures on accruals 
quality in Canada could be that the substitution involving external audit is complete (i.e., 100%) such that 
accruals quality is unaffected by internal control weaknesses.  Both standard setters (AICPA 1997; 
PCAOB 2007) and prior literature (Simunic 1980; Griffin et al. 2008; Prawitt, Smith, and Wood 2009) 
suggest that a substitution effect exists between the internal control systems established by management 
and the external monitoring by auditors with respect to financial reporting errors.  Based on such an 
argument, a given level of accrual quality can be achieved by sacrificing some internal control quality but 
predicts a positive relationship between the 
number of internal control weaknesses and unsigned unexplained accruals.  
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improving the quality of external monitoring.  Hence, it does not follow necessarily that lower internal 
control quality should result in lower accrual quality since external audit effort influences whether accrual 
quality is lower or not.   
The extant empirical evidence about the relationship between internal control weaknesses, audit 
fees and accruals quality indirectly supports this substitution argument.  Prior studies show that the level 
of firm investment in internal audit is a significantly negative determinant of external audit fees (e.g., 
Felix, Gramling, and Maletta  2001) and that the internal audit function helps prevent material 
weaknesses from occurring (Lin, Pizzini, Vargus, and Bardhan 2010). Raghunandan and Rama (2006) 
demonstrate that more internal control weaknesses are associated with higher audit fees for SOX 404 
firms. Hogan and Wilkins (2008) and Hoitash et al. (2008) find the same association for SOX 302 firms. 
Numerous empirical audit studies have established a positive association between audit effort and higher 
accrual quality, whether using simple (e.g., Kinney and Martin 1994) or complex research designs (e.g., 
Larcker and Richardson 2004).  This combination of theoretical and empirical analysis leads to our 
second and third hypotheses:
HYPOTHESIS 2: A greater number of internal control weaknesses reported by Canadian public 
companies in their MD&A results in higher audit effort, hence, audit fees.  
  
HYPOTHESIS 3: Higher audit fees, reflecting higher audit effort, results in higher audited accrual 
quality. 
Empirically Hypothesis 2 (H2) implies a positive relationship between number of internal control 
weaknesses reported and audit fees and Hypothesis 3 (H3) implies a negative relationship between audit 
fees and unsigned unexplained accruals.  Combining H1 – H3 we have the net effect of the number of 
internal control weaknesses on accrual quality. Given SOX North ICOFR disclosure requirements, it 
would appear that Canadian regulators do not believe that the substitution of higher audit effort for weak 
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internal controls is perfect.3 If this belief is correct, in our path analysis we would expect to observe a 
positive net effect between internal control weaknesses and unsigned unexplained accruals. Empirically, 
in our recursive path analysis this would be reflected in a positive direct relationship from internal control 
weaknesses to unsigned unexplained accruals and a smaller net negative indirect relationship between 
internal control weaknesses and unsigned unexplained accruals via audit fees.  If the substitution is 
complete, the posited negative indirect relationship would be the same size as the positive direct 
relationship between internal control weaknesses and accruals, hence implying a finding of the null of H1
 
 
in our regression analysis.  
3. Data and descriptive statistics  
We start with all Canadian firms in the Compustat 2006 data file. We obtain the annual reports 
and proxy statements ( known in Canada as “Management Information Circulars”) for all firms with year 
ends immediately following June 29, 2006 from SEDAR.com and/or for those Canadian firms cross listed 
on the U.S. exchanges from EDGAR online.   Any missing data items on Compustat are collected from 
the financial statements by a doctoral student and are carefully checked by one of the authors and a 
second doctoral student.  The stock price at the end of fiscal year 2006 for some firms is collected from 
finance.yahoo.com. 
All internal control weaknesses are coded by hand by a doctoral student who is a chartered 
accountant with five years of experience, recoded independently by one of the authors who is also a 
chartered accountant, and reconciled by a third doctoral student with a master degree in accounting.4
                                                             
3 Regulators are concerned with a firm’s internal control choices for reasons beyond unacceptable accrual quality, 
post audit. For example, internal control quality can affect the accuracy of management guidance based on interim 
numbers (Feng, Li and McVay 2009). 
  The 
second example in Appendix 1 illustrates that the disclosures require a fair bit of accounting and control 
4 Early in the coding process we checked for inter-rater reliability between the primary two coders on the first 152 
companies coded. For number of internal control weaknesses disclosed Cronbach’s alpha (adjusted) was 0.943 and 
for weakness disclosed (yes/no) was Cronbach’s alpha was 0.952. Given this high level of initial coding agreement, 
although the coders continued to discuss and resolve the differences, formal statistics were not tracked for the 
remaining firms’ coding. 
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expertise in order to ascertain the number of internal control weaknesses.  All governance compliance 
data are collected by hand from the proxy statements by 18 undergraduate RA’s who cross check 100% of 
each other’s work. In addition, 20% of the undergraduate RA’s work is subject to random quality audits 
by a doctoral student with a master degree in accounting with two years of work experience.  We obtain 
the number of professional accountants (Chartered Accountants, Certified Management Accountants, and 
Certified General Accountants) for each firm. As the data provided by these three professional accounting 
organizations are at the company (subsidiary) level, we employed four research assistants under the 
supervision of one of the authors to aggregate the numbers by Compustat firm (i.e. the publicly traded 
company) to get the total number professional accountants hired by each firm.5
The 2006 Compustat data file consists of 1,230 active firms. We are able to obtain a mostly 
complete sample of data for 826 firms out of these 1,230 in 2006.  Accrual quality, cash flow volatility 
and sales volatility measures need at least three years information to calculate, which gives us a sample 
with 603 firms. We further eliminate 133 firms cross listed in U.S., so our final sample consists of 470 
firms. We focus on Canadian only firms because the cross-listed firms are permitted by CSA MLI 52-109 
(CSA 2005a) to substitute their certifications under U.S. SOX 302 and 404 for the Canadian disclosures, 
although in the vast majority of cases cross listed firms explicitly reported both. The Canadian only listed 
firms thus provide an uncontaminated test of our hypotheses albeit at the loss of a significant number of 
observations. In Section 6, we test the robustness of our results for full sample.  Panel A of Table 2 
describes this sample selection process.  
   
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Table 2, panel B reports descriptive statistics for all variables in our analysis measured at the end 
of fiscal year 2006. Some sample characteristics are noteworthy. The median total assets of Canadian 
listed only firms is $235 million (reported in log form in Table 2), suggesting that many firms are small. 
The average age is 14, indicating that the firms are relatively older as the data requirement in calculating 
accrual quality has excluded newer firms. The mean of the number of internal control weakness is 0.49. 
                                                             
5 We use Statistics Canada and Dun & Bradstreet to identify the subsidies of these Canadian Compustat firms.  
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78% of firms were audited by Big-4 and 7% of firms changed their auditors in 2006. In addition, 13% of 
firms restated their earnings due to errors or the change of estimates within the four fiscal years preceding 
2006.  While the mean of return on assets (ROA) is negative, the majority of the firms are profitable with 
a median ROA 0.04.  Table 3 provides Pearson correlations between variables. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
4.   The direct relationship between control weaknesses and accrual quality 
Empirical method – regression analysis 
We employ OLS and two-stage regressions to test H1 while controlling for known factors that 
affect the relationship between the number of internal control weaknesses and accrual quality. This first 
step helps us to establish the credibility of Canadian internal control weakness disclosures, subject to our 
caveat about direct and indirect effects. According to H1, we expect to find a positive relationship 
between the number of internal control weaknesses and unsigned unexplained accruals.       
We measure accrual quality by unsigned unexplained accruals obtained from the Dechow-Dichev 
model (DDAAQ).  There are three assumptions underlying our analyses. First, internal control in 2006 is 
the same as internal control in prior years. This is a reasonable assumption given the high uncertainty 
about the effective date of implementation (the certifications to be filed for fiscal year 2006 were not 
finalized until December 2005 (CSA 2005b)). The internal control stability assumption is also common to 
the SOX 302/404 literature (e.g., Doyle et al. 2007a). We also assume that accrual quality is stable over 
time and measure unsigned unexplained accruals using data for the six-year period 2001-2006.  This 
assumption is common in the earnings quality literature (e.g., Dechow and Dichev 2002). Finally, we 
assume that 2006 audit fees proxy for audit effort during the 2001-2006 period for which accrual quality 
is measured (see Hay, Knechel, and Wong 2006 for evidence of reasonableness of this assumption).  
To demonstrate the robustness of our findings, we follow Ball and Shivakumar (2006) who 
suggest that nonlinear accrual models incorporating the timely recognition of losses perform better than 
linear models.  Hence, we add a current year cash flow dummy and its interaction with the level of cash 
15 
 
flows into the Dechow and Dichev model. We call this new measure BSAQ and conduct the same 
analyses as a robustness check.  
Regression results 
We employ the following equation in our OLS regression analysis:  
DDAAQ  =β0+β1 Num ICW +β2Assets +β3Num of business segments +β4
   +β
CF volatility  
5Sales Volatility +β6Age +β7Loss +β8Return on assets +β9
Our main independent variable is the number of internal control weaknesses (Num ICW). The 
expected coefficient for Num ICW is positive. The remainder of equation (1) consists of control variables 
reported as statistically significant in Doyle et al. (2007a).
Foreign transactions +ε     (1) 
6
There are 4 levels of reported internal control weaknesses:  zero, one, two and three or more 
reported weaknesses.
  Appendix 2 provides the detailed definition 
of each variable and here we discuss the expected sign for each coefficient. Assets is total assets with the 
expected sign being negative, i.e., larger firms have lower DDAAQ (high accrual quality). The number of 
business segments, cash flow volatility (CF volatility) and sales volatility are three variables significantly 
correlated with accrual quality (Doyle et al. 2007a; Hribar and Nichols 2007). We expect the coefficients 
for the above three variables to be positive, i.e., more complex firms with high cash flows volatility and 
sales volatility have high DDAAQ. The predicted signs for Age and Return on assets are negative and for 
Loss and Foreign transactions are positive.  
7
                                                             
6 There are small differences between our variable measurement and that employed by Doyle et al. (2007a). In order 
to measure the existence of losses, Doyle et al. (2007a) use the proportion of losses over the last seven years and we 
use a 2006 loss indicator and return on assets.  In addition, although operating cycle is significant in the regression 
model reported by Doyle et al. (2007a), we do not include this variable as we would lose 34% of our observations. 
Nevertheless, when we re-run the regression for the reduced sample and include operating cycle in the model, our 
results do not change.  
 The most commonly disclosed internal control design weaknesses were around 
segregation of duties, lack of appropriate accounting or other expertise, and inadequate information 
systems.  Unreported statistics show an average DDAAQ of 0.06, 0.08, 0.08 and 0.09 across zero, one, 
two and three or more reported weaknesses.  The patterns reveal a monotonically declining accrual 
quality pattern (accrual quality again being the inverse of the measure DDAAQ) as the number of internal 
7 This four category classification also makes this variable appropriate for inclusion as a structural variable in our 
path analysis (Garson 2009). 
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control weaknesses increases. The differences in DDAAQ between the zero weakness group and the one, 
two, and three or more groups are significant, with t-values equal to 1.98, 1.81, and 2.81, respectively.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 present the OLS regression coefficients and t-statistics, respectively. 
The variable of interest is Num ICW.  The coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 5% one 
tailed conventional level. Thus, when the number of internal control weaknesses is high, DDAAQ is large, 
i.e., accrual quality is low.   The results for the other control variables are generally consistent with 
predictions. The variables Assets, CF volatility, Sales volatility, Age, Number of business segments, Loss, 
and Return on assets are statistically significantly associated with accrual quality. Small firms with higher 
sales volatility have higher DDAAQ, thus poorer accrual quality. Firms with higher returns on assets and 
older firms have higher accrual quality.  
We consider the number of internal control weakness as a better proxy for internal control quality 
than an indicator variable capturing whether there is at least one internal control weakness. Nevertheless, 
we replace Num ICW with an indicator variable, ICW, assuming a value “1” if a firm reports one or more 
internal control weaknesses and “0” otherwise.  The coefficient for ICW is significant with t-value of 
2.24.  
In the above OLS regression, we assume that the number of internal control weaknesses is 
exogenous. However, the number of internal control weaknesses and accrual quality may be jointly 
endogenous. To examine the robustness of our Table 4 results to this concern, we supplement OLS 
regression with a two-stage regression. In the first stage, we use an ordinal probit model to estimate the 
expected number of internal control weaknesses. The independent variables consist of the variables 
besides Num ICW in equation (1) and the additional determinants of the number of internal control 
weaknesses in equation (3) as described in Section 5.  In the second stage, we replace Num ICW with the 
estimated number of internal control weaknesses from the first stage. We find the coefficient on this new 
variable remains significantly positive with t-value=1.75.  All coefficients are in general robust to this 
two-stage regression approach. Columns 5 and 6 of Table 4 report the results. 
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In summary, regression analysis suggests that the existence of internal control weaknesses affects 
accrual quality among Canadian firms. As such, the evidence suggests that Canadian firms’ internal 
control weakness disclosures are credible. 
  
5. Tests of H2 and H3 with further tests of H1 
Empirical method – path analyses embedded in a structural model 
We use path analysis embedded in a structural equation model (Bollen 1989a; Wong and Law 
1999) to examine the hypothesized relations among the number of internal control weaknesses, audit fees 
and accrual quality while controlling for well known determinants of each of these path variables.8 This 
approach tests the direct effect from internal control weakness to accrual quality and the indirect effect 
between the two via audit fees. We employ a recursive path model premised on the assumption that audit 
effort is allocated based on the auditor’s observation of internal control quality. The recursive path model 
is shown in Figure 1 (solid lines only). In addition to the expected positive relationship between the 
number of internal control weaknesses and unsigned unexplained accruals (H1), we expect a positive path 
coefficient from the number of internal control weakness to audit fees (H2) and a negative path 
coefficient from audit fees to unsigned unexplained accruals (H3). We report maximum likelihood 
estimates as they have several advantages over other estimation methods, such as being robust over non-
normal data, providing overall model fit measures, providing tests of statistical significance, etc. (Lance, 
Cornwell and Mulaik 1988). 9
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
                                                             
8 Structural equations models are frequently thought of as involving only latent variables, their indicators and the 
paths among the latent variables. However, it should be noted that structural models are generalizations of the 
general linear model (including OLS regression) and path analysis provides the ability to carry out a more robust test 
of hypotheses (Garson 2009, Arbuckle and Wothke 1999). 
9 We have replicated all of our analyses employing generalized least squares estimation and asymptotic covariance 
estimates instead of maximum likelihood estimates and the results are essentially the same, with minor differences 
in levels of significance but not in the inferences obtained. These robustness checks provide some assurance that the 
exact model specification issues often raised against using maximum likelihood estimates are not a problem in our 
models (Lance et al. 1988). 
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Path analytical models tested within structural equations modeling software are widely used in 
many disciplines because they enable researchers to examine direct and indirect effects while explicitly 
taking into account measurement errors in both dependent and independent variables (Bollen 1989a; 
Wong and Law 1999; Kline and Klammer 2001).  The hypothesized path model can be tested using either 
a recursive analysis or a non-recursive bi-directional path analysis where simultaneity among our three 
choice variables is assumed (Figure 1). Using either approach, the researcher seeks to determine the 
extent to which the hypothesized path model is consistent with the data, based on a fit assessment of the 
measurement model. We present the unidirectional path analysis as our main results and the non-recursive 
path analysis as a robustness check of our hypotheses. 
Measurement model 
 Each path variable in Figure 1 (internal control weakness, audit fees, and accrual quality) is 
estimated with respect to control variables selected based on prior literature. In the recursive setting (see 
the solid lines of Figure 1), internal control weaknesses are a determinant of audit fees but audit fees are 
not an explanatory variable in the internal control weakness equation.  All variables in the following 
equations are defined in Appendix 2. 
Audit Fee Equation 
The determinants of audit fees have been explored extensively in the literature. Hay et al. (2006) 
survey the literature and conclude that audit fees are generally affected by firm size, organization 
complexity, inherent risk, profitability, leverage, internal control quality, industry, and audit quality. 
Further, we predict that audit fees are affected by internal control weaknesses (H2). Based on Hay et al.’s 
meta-analysis of the audit fee model literature, we adopt the fee model in equation (2).  
Audit Fee = β0 +β1NumICW + β2Assets +β3 Inventory&Receivables +β4
+β
Current assets  
5Num of business segments+β6Num of geographic segments+β7
+ β
Book-to-market ratio  
8Leverage+β9Return on assets+β10Auditor+β11
Equation (2) shows that Audit Fee is affected by the number of internal control weakness (Num 
ICW) as well as those determinants identified in prior studies. It is expected that audit fees increase with 
Financial industry dummy + ε      (2) 
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firm size. Operating complexity is proxied by the number of business segments and the number of 
geographic segments. We expect the coefficients for both variables to be positive, i.e., the more complex 
the firm, the higher the audit fee. Inherent risk is proxied by four variables – Inventory & receivables, 
Current assets, Leverage, and Book-to-market ratio.  The predicted signs for the first three variables are 
positive and the predicted sign for Book-to-market ratio is negative. The predictions imply that audit fees 
increase in operating risk. Profitability is measured by Return on assets and external monitoring is 
proxied by auditor characteristics. We create an indicator variable, Auditor, given that “Big-4” auditors 
are perceived to provide better audit quality (see, for example, Khurana and Raman 2004).  The industry 
indicator variable (Financial industry dummy), based on SIC codes, separates the financial industry from 
other industries.  
Internal Control Weakness Equation 
Following Doyle et al. (2007b) and Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007), we adopt the following 
internal control weakness model:10
NumICW =β
 
0+β1Assets+β2Age +β3Num of business segments +β4Loss +β5Foreign transactions 
+β6Inventory + β7Audit committee score +β8Abnormal NPAP +β9
+ β
Restatment  
10Auditor +β11
 
Auditor change + ε               (3) 
Equation (3) includes both risk and incentive factors.  Regarding the proxies for risk factors, we 
have the following predictions: We expect that larger and older firms have fewer internal control 
weaknesses. Thus, the expected coefficient for Assets and Age is negative. The predicted sign for the 
number of business segments is positive, i.e., as the number of business segments increases, the likelihood 
of having internal control weaknesses increases. Loss is an indicator variable, equalling “1” if earnings 
before extraordinary items is negative, and “0” otherwise. We also include a foreign transaction dummy 
variable and the level of inventory. The expected sign is positive for both variables.  
                                                             
10 To ensure we have enough observations and to limit the number of parameters to be estimated, we do not include 
(or are unable to include in certain cases) all variables identified in Doyle et al. (2007b). For example, the values for 
the number of sponsored special purpose entities (SPE), acquisition value, and restructuring charge are missing for 
many Canadian firms as they are not required for Canadian only listers.    
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Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) examines SOX 302 internal control deficiency disclosures and 
suggests that the disclosure decision is the trade-off between costs and benefits. They use institutional 
investor concentration, earnings restatement, Big-6 auditor, and litigation to proxy for the managers’ 
incentives to discover and disclose internal control deficiencies under SOX 302.  We use similar proxies 
for these factors to control for disclosure incentives except for litigation.11
Firms are more likely to be forthcoming about control problems when the quality of their 
financial reports has been questioned by auditors and market regulators in the past, so firms with a 
restatement history may have incentives to disclose internal control weaknesses (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
2007). We include a Restatement dummy variable in equation (3). The variable assumes a value of “1” if 
the company has at least one restatement due to errors or the change of estimates within the four fiscal 
years preceding the 2006 fiscal year. We collect the restatement information for Canadian firms through 
  The variable Audit committee 
score is audit committee quality score (see Appendix 2 for the computation details).  It is developed to 
measure the degree of compliance with the Canadian guidelines for audit committees and to proxy for 
audit committee oversight. Krishnan (2005) shows that audit committee quality is negatively associated 
with the incidence of internal control problems and Goh (2009) suggests that effective audit committees 
can ensure the timely remediation of material internal control weaknesses. The variable Abnormal NPAP 
measures the abnormal number of professional accountants (CA, CMA, CGA) hired by the firm and 
proxies for the quality of the internal control environment. The residuals of the regression employing the 
logarithm of the number of professional accountants on the measures of firm size, risk, complexity, etc. 
are defined as the abnormal number of professional accountants (Abnormal NPAP). We expect the signs 
on both variables to be negative.   
                                                             
11 The legal system in Canada, in contrast to that in the U.S., makes it very difficult to launch class action lawsuits 
by investors (Jamal 2009). Thus, litigation is not a serious concern for Canadian firms and is unlikely to be an 
important factor driving the disclosure decision. In addition, while we do not have institutional ownership data, our 
equation (3) employs audit committee score and the abnormal number of professional accountants working for the 
company as proxies for the quality of monitoring of management. Also, when we control for the presence of at least 
one large shareholder (i.e. greater than 10% of the equity outstanding which is a required Canadian disclosure), our 
untabulated results are the same. 
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text searching in the DisclosureNet database.12
Accrual Quality Equation 
  We expect the sign on Restatement to be positive. Finally, 
we control for Auditor and Auditor change, dummy variables defined in Appendix 2.  The expected signs 
are negative and positive, respectively.  
We use the following accrual quality model: 
DDAAQ = β0 +β1Audit Fee + β2Num ICW + β3Age + β4CF Volatility +β5
+β
Sales volatility  
6Audit committee score + β7
 
Board of directors score + ε             (4) 
DDAAQ is the same dependent variable as in the previous section. Cash flow and sales volatility are the 
two most significant variables correlated with unsigned unexplained accruals (Hribar and Nichols 2007). 
Higher volatility of cash flows and sales should lead to higher unsigned unexplained accruals, so the 
predicted signs for the two variables are positive. Board of directors score is a board of director quality 
score. The higher the score of Audit committee and Board of directors, the higher the quality of 
monitoring by audit committee and board of directors.13
Model fit and the measurement model 
 Thus, the signs for the two variables are expected 
to be negative. 
Model over fitting is frequently subject to criticism in structural equations research (e.g., Chin 
1998, Brannick 1995) due to the fact that model fit can be improved in two ways, namely, specification of 
what paths between variables exist and specification of what variables are allowed to covary.  Bollen 
(1989a) notes that the role of ex ante theory is more important in SEM research. Hence, we relied heavily 
on theory, including prior empirical studies documenting consistent empirical associations, to determine 
the variables we included in our measurement models (equations (2) to (4)).  We then subject the various 
measurement models to both traditional OLS screening techniques (e.g., tests of multicollinearity among 
                                                             
12 Our search identified 399 restatement records involving in 262 Canadian firms. These restatements are due to 
errors or the change of estimates or the change of accounting standards. After excluding accounting standard 
changes, we identified for our full sample 95 firms having restatements.  
13 We verified the two measures by regressing each score on a set of traditional governance variables. The test shows 
that both variables are significantly associated with standard governance variables. For example, Audit committee 
score is associated with audit committee size, financial expertise of audit committee, etc.; Board of directors score 
is associated with board size, percentage of independent directors, and Chair/CEO separation dummy variable. 
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the variables) and SEM model specification techniques (e.g., model convergence).14 For the basic 
measurement model in Figure 1 we allow variables to covary with each other only if the relation passes 
the substantive test of economic intuition (e.g., Age of firm covaries with total Assets).15
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
  With respect to 
such specification searches, we ensure that improvements to the measurement models are not driven 
merely by indices of model fit. Indeed, we set our level for consideration of a modification index at 7 
which is nearly twice the level recommended (for an elaboration, see Arbuckle and Wothke 1999). 
Table 5 presents various measures of fit for the recursive path analysis models (Thompson 2000; 
Garson 2009).  There is no consensus on what fit measures to report except that too few and too many are 
not appropriate. Thompson (2000, p. 270-271) describes the CFI - the comparative fit index and the 
RMSEA - the root mean square error approximation as being the two most informative criteria for 
assessing model fit and Garson (2009) advocates adding the χ2 divided by the degrees freedom test.  The 
benchmarks for the goodness of fit measures reported in Table 5 (including the classic χ2 test) are a CFI 
approaching 1 with anything over 0.90 indicating a moderately good fit, a RMSEA approaching 0 with 
either 0.05 or 0.08 being the benchmark of a good fit, and a non-significant χ2 test result (Chau 1997; 
Thompson 2000; Garson 2009).16  We also report the IFI (incremental fit index) and from our asymptotic 
tests the original Goodness of Fit (GFI) and Adjusted Goodness of Fit (AGFI) with all three having the 
same interpretation as the CFI.17
                                                             
14 The SEM software we employ provides a warning of model lack of convergence due to such factors as indefinite 
variance covariance matrices and in the case of our robustness checks using non-recursive modeling warnings about 
model stability, i.e., the estimates of the structural coefficients and their associated probabilities are not unique 
(Schaubrouck 1990). 
  Shown in Table 5, the model exhibits good fit. For example, CFI is 
0.927 and RMSEA is 0.04.   
15 For conciseness, the covariances in the measurement models are not reported but are available upon request.    
16 The concept of a non-significant χ2 may seem non-intuitive. Statistically, the test is of the null hypotheses that 
there is no better fitting model available and hence an insignificant finding suggests a well fitting model. However, 
the χ2 test is highly sensitive to sample size (Brannick 1995, 205), that is, with large samples it is rare to find a non-
significant chi-square.  Our sample size falls into the category of moderately large by SEM standards. One proposed 
approach to deal with the increasing sample size resulting in spurious significance is to use the criterion of chi-
square divided by degrees of freedom, with anything less than 3 being shown in simulation studies as indicating a 
good fit (Chau 1997). 
17 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting that we employ multiple goodness of fit measures. 
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For expositional purposes we proceed in the order of equations (2) to (4). Table 6, panel A 
presents the results for the audit fee model (equation (2)). Hypothesis 2 is supported by the significantly 
positive coefficient for Num ICW.  Audit fees increase with firm size as indicated by a positive coefficient 
of 0.454.  Panel A also reveals that audit fees increase with the following attributes: (i) complexity, as 
proxied by the number of business and geographical segments and (ii) inherent risk, as proxied by current 
assets, inventory & receivables, and leverage. Audit fees decrease with the following attributes: 
profitability, as proxied by return on assets and industry, as proxied by a dummy variable used to 
represent financial institutions.  The corresponding coefficients for these variables are all in the predicted 
direction and statistically significant. Panel A also reports the Squared Multiple Correlation (SMC), a 
pseudo R2 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
measure capturing the extent of the variation explained by the model. The SMC is above 60%, 
suggesting that a substantial variation of audit fees is explained by the model.  
Table 6, panel B reports the results for the internal control weaknesses model (equation (3)).18 
The number of reported internal control weaknesses decreases in firm size and increases in the number of 
business segments and the presence of foreign currency translation amounts.  The corresponding 
coefficients are -0.070, 0.082 and 0.128.  The signs on Inventory and Restatement support our predictions 
as well. Consistent with the results reported in Doyle et al. (2007b), we do not observe a significant 
association between our audit committee governance score and internal control weaknesses. Auditor and 
Auditor change are insignificant. The small amount of variation explained by the model (SMC = 5.1%) 
indicates that internal control weakness disclosures are noisy, decreasing model fit.19
                                                             
18 We repeat our recursive path analysis using an indicator variable for the presence/absence of internal control 
weaknesses.  Results are the same using this alternative definition of control weaknesses similar to that employed by 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2008) and others who posit the mere presence of a weakness is sufficient. However, the use 
of a single indicator variable as a structural variable is not recommended for SEM path analysis. Hence, we do not 
tabulate these results (Garson 2009; Bollen 1989a). 
  
19 One potential source of noise is incomplete disclosures by management. We are not able to compare our model fit 
with Doyle et al. (2007b) as they do not report the pseudo R2 in their logistic regression. Any noise in our observed 
ICW disclosures works against our rejecting the credibility null in tests of equation (4). 
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Table 6, panel C reports the results for our accrual quality model (equation (4)). The first two 
rows provide unstandardized coefficients for Num ICW and Audit Fee. Both variables are significantly 
associated with accrual quality, supporting Hypotheses 1 and 3. DDAAQ is increasing in sales volatility. 
The corresponding coefficient of 0.043 is significant and in the predicted direction.  We find that board of 
directors score is associated with accrual quality, with stronger boards being associated with lower levels 
of abnormal accruals. However, audit committee score continues to be insignificant.    
Recursive path analysis results  
Table 6 provides the unstandardized coefficients and significance levels.  Figure 2 reports the 
standardized coefficient values.  The latter allows combining direct and indirect coefficients along the 
paths as they are expressed in common units (standard deviations).  The positive path coefficient of 0.136 
from NumIcw to DDAAQ implies that a one standard deviation increase in Num ICW results in a 0.136 
standard deviation increase in DDAAQ. This supports the significant negative direct effect of internal 
control weaknesses on accrual quality (the inverse of DDAAQ) and continues to support the first 
hypothesis.  The indirect effect is composed of the positive direct effect (path coefficient=0.053) of the 
number of internal control weaknesses on audit fees (more weakness result in more substantive auditing), 
consistent with H2; and the direct negative effect (path coefficient=-0.098) from audit fees to DDAAQ 
(more audit effort results in fewer deliberate or accidental financial accounting errors), consistent with 
H3. Combining the two paths, we have a net negative indirect effect of -0.0052 (-0.098*0.053). It reduces 
the positive direct effect from Num ICW to DDAAQ by 4% (-0.0052/0.136). The 4% reduction may be 
considered as the offsetting effect of external audit on increasing accrual quality in the presence of 
weaknesses in the internal control system; hence, a potential measure of the value of external auditing in 
this specific setting. The overall positive net effect on DDAAQ implies an incomplete, albeit statistically 
significant, substitution effect between internal control strength and external audit monitoring. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
The net effect is consistent with the findings of Doyle et al. (2007a), who report that the existence 
of SOX 302 and 404 internal control weaknesses in U.S. firms are associated with lower accrual quality.  
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It is also consistent with the findings of Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2008), who demonstrate that firms 
reporting internal control weaknesses have lower accrual quality. Our results extend these studies by 
showing how audit effort can indirectly mitigate the effect of internal control design weakness on accrual 
quality.  The increase of audit fees in response to the increase of the number of internal control design 
weaknesses improves accrual quality, although the size of such an effect (about 4%) is small.  
 
6. Robustness of results  
 In our first robustness test we relax the assumption that audit effort is determined sequentially. 
We allow for non recursive (i.e. bi-directional) relationships to exist between our three main constructs 
(see solid and dashed lines in Figure 1) in a structural equation model. This provides a test of whether our 
results differ when allowing for endogeneity between the three path variables. In our second robustness 
test, we demonstrate robustness via an alternative Dechow and Dichev measure that incorporates the 
suggested modifications of McNichols (2002) and Ball and Shivakumar (2006). Third, we report the 
results from tests controlling for additional internal control risk attributes. Finally, we compare the 
existing results with the results based on the sample consisting of both cross listed and Canadian listed 
only firms.   
 
Allowing for endogeneity between internal control, audit effort, and accrual quality 
The original path analysis is premised on the assumption that audit effort choice is made after 
auditors observe internal control quality. Accrual quality is thus affected by both internal control quality 
and the resulting audit effort.  An alternative possibility is that the planned level of accrual quality, 
internal control quality, and external monitoring by auditors are jointly endogenous choice variables.  
According to Simunic (1980) and Griffin et al. (2008), a company chooses simultaneously the level of 
both internal monitoring and external monitoring to reach a planned level of accrual quality ex ante. 
Under such a scenario, the level of accrual quality can be achieved by planning internal monitoring 
quality and the quality of external monitoring at the same point of time, e.g., at the beginning of the year, 
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and audit fee is an expected fee to be charged. If the monitoring investment is planned, it could be carried 
out in a complementary fashion (i.e., investing in higher levels of internal controls and external audit at 
the same time due to the change in the external regulatory climate).  Based on this intuition, we explore 
the relationship among the three path variables using non-recursive path analysis.  
The non-recursive path model is more appropriate when the time period is sufficiently long to 
allow all three endogenous variables to affect each other. Since we observe internal control design 
weaknesses for 2006 only, this assumption may not be valid in our setting.  Canadian firms may not have 
had time to alter ICOFR in response to SOX North regulations, given the uncertainty regarding passage of 
52-109. As such, the 2006 ICOFR we observe are best characterized as lagged endogenous variables 
which are exogenous entering the 2006 fiscal year. Thus, 2006 audit fees respond in a recursive fashion to 
observed 2006 ICOFR but it is less plausible that 2006 ICOFR responds to 2006 audit fees, given the 
above mentioned short reaction time. This explains why we report the non-recursive analysis as a 
robustness check only. A longer panel of ICOFR disclosures would be required to fully explore 
simultaneity as firms move to a new equilibrium in response to SOX North related regulatory changes.   
Figure 1 also presents our non-recursive model (arrows in both directions with solid and dashed 
lines). If theory suggests alternative models, researchers may turn to model fit statistics showing 
empirically which model better fits a set of data (e.g., whether the relationship can only go in a single 
direction versus being bi-directional in our study).  We compare the fit of the non-recursive (bi-
directional) model with the fit of the unidirectional path analysis model. The non-recursive model appears 
to better fit the data than the recursive model based on the non-recursive model having a higher CFI and 
lower RMESA; moreover, the difference in χ2  fit measures between the two models is highly statistically 
significant.20
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 Thus, the fit evidence warrants reporting the results using non-recursive analysis as a 
robustness check.   
                                                             
20 A comparison of Panel D of Table 7 to Table 5 indicates a CFI of 0.937 versus 0.927 and a RMESA of 0.037 
versus 0.040, respectively.  In addition, the non-recursive model is significantly better fit than the recursive model 
(χ(1)=21.2, p<0.0001). 
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We find that the sign and the significance of the coefficients in our non-recursive path analysis 
continue to support our initial hypotheses (see Table 7) as well as documenting evidence of the 
endogenous nature of these variables. The non-recursive path analysis reveals a pattern of significant bi-
directionality, indicating the potential for two-way causality.  This finding suggests that there may be both 
substitutes and complements effects at work in this setting. The key inferences regarding hypotheses H1-
H3 remain unchanged. Thus, our conclusion that Canadian internal control weaknesses are credible is not 
affected by allowing for endogeneity. We leave further exploration of the endogeneity issue to future 
research.   
 Alternative accrual quality measure 
We create an alternative accrual quality measure, BSAQ, based on the following two 
modifications of the Dechow and Dichev model. First, following prior studies (McNichols 2002; Francis, 
LaFond, Olsson and Schipper 2005; Doyle et al. 2007a), we include the current year change in revenues 
and the current year level of property, plant, and equipment as additional controls in the basic Dechow 
and Dichev model. Second, Ball and Shivakumar (2006) suggest that nonlinear accrual models 
incorporating the timely recognition of losses perform better than linear models.  We create a dummy 
variable which equals “1” if current year cash flows are negative (“0” otherwise) and augment the 
Dechow and Dichev model by controlling for the interaction between this dummy variable and current 
year cash flows.  We conduct the same regression and path analysis using the BSAQ measure. 
The untabulated results for the BSAQ measure using OLS and two-stage regression are robust for 
all variables. The standardized path coefficients for the recursive path analysis are reported in panel A of 
Table 8. The direct effect of Num ICW on BSAQ is positive and significant as predicted by H1 (0.091), the 
path from Num ICW to Audit Fee is positive and significant as predicted by H2 (0.046) and the effect of 
Audit Fee on BSAQ is negative and significant as predicted by H3 (-0.087).  This leads to an overall 
positive net effect of 0.086 (0.091+ (-0.087*0.046)), which represents a 4.4% reduction over the direct 
positive effect.  Hence, this more comprehensive accrual model leads to the same conclusion regarding 
disclosure credibility. For completeness, we report results from the non-recursive bidirectional analysis in 
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panel B. Our hypothesized results are still maintained and continue to show the significant bi-directional 
effects found in the previous robustness analysis. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 Controls for additional factors that potentially determine Num ICW  
We repeat our recursive path analysis after augmenting equation (3) for additional factors that 
potentially determine Num ICW. 21
Robustness check using both cross listed and Canadian listed only firms 
  To reduce the number of parameters requiring estimation, we 
incorporate each factor one at a time. We first control for the following two factors (see Appendix 2 for 
variable definition): Leverage and financial industry dummy. Next, we control for additional internal 
control risk attributes employed by Ashbaugh-Skaife et al (2007): Growth, measured as the average 
growth in sales from 2004 to 2006, and Z-Score, the Altman (1980) Z-score measure of distress risk. Our 
recursive path analysis shows that none of the coefficients on these additional control variables are 
significant. Further, the inclusion of these variables does not change any of our inferences regarding H1-
H3 using recursive path analysis. 
  Cross listed firms are much larger than Canadian listed firms. The median total assets of the non-
cross-listed firms is $235 million while the median total assets for the cross listed firms is $633 million. 
In untabulated analysis, we observe that slightly more non-cross-listed firms (24%) versus cross listed 
firms (19%) disclose control weaknesses; however, this difference is not statistically significant. The 
firms cross listed in the U.S. are subject to the more strict SOX regulations which may make the 
disclosures more credible. This makes cross listed firms an interesting benchmark sample. We thus 
conduct analysis using the sample consisting of both cross listed and Canadian listed only firms (603 
observations in total).  In our OLS regression analysis, we add an interaction term Crosslist*Num ICW in 
equation (1) to capture the incremental effect of cross listing. The interaction term is significantly positive 
with t-value=1.52, suggesting that the association between internal control weakness and accrual quality 
                                                             
21 We thank an anonymous reviewer for the insight that the determinants of audit fees could also potentially be 
determinants of Num ICW and accordingly we conduct this robustness check. 
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is slightly stronger for the cross-listed firms than Canadian listed firms in OLS regression. However, 
when we repeat the analysis for the 603 observations using the  two-stage regression approach (as in 
Table 4), we do not observe a significant difference in the association between Num ICW and accrual 
quality  between cross listed and non-cross-listed firms. In addition, all our results from the path analysis 
reported in previous section are robust to this full sample. Of the 133 cross-listed firms, 18 firms have 
market capitalization smaller than $75 million, qualifying as non-accelerated filers under SOX 404. 
Hence, under Canadian regulations these 18 firms must comply with 52-109 while also complying with 
US SOX 302.  Again, reclassifying these 18 firms as Canadian only firms or deleting them does not 
change our inferences.  
            The above analysis, while preliminary, does not suggest a substantial amount of credibility 
enhancement when firms are subject to the stricter and more comprehensive U.S reporting requirements 
for ICOFR.  We leave it to future research to investigate whether adding implementation testing and 
management certification to SOX North (as was required in 2008 but not substantially implemented until 
2009) results in an increase in credibility.  
 
7. Conclusions 
 We examine a unique Canadian setting where 2006 ICOFR disclosures are provided to investors 
without a definition of a design weakness to be reported, without control implementation effectiveness 
testing, no management certification of the completeness of the disclosures and no external audit of such 
disclosures. The one offsetting credibility enhancing mechanism was the requirement to place the design 
weakness disclosures, if any, in MD&A. The MD&A has to be approved by the Audit Committee and the 
Board of Directors and hence such disclosures would be reviewed by these corporate governance actors.  
Though the costs of such disclosures are lower than in the U.S. 302/404 settings, the credibility of these 
disclosures is far from assured and hence poses an important empirical issue for regulators interested in 
the benefit versus cost trade-off of various disclosure regimes. Hence, this setting required us to carefully 
consider the potential for substitution between internal and external monitoring both theoretically and 
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empirically.   
Using OLS and two-stage regressions, we find evidence that the disclosures are credible as there 
is a negative association between internal control weaknesses and accrual quality. In addition, our 
recursive path analysis reveals an offsetting net indirect effect from internal control weakness to accrual 
quality via audit effort. This substitution effect of increased external monitoring in the presence of control 
weaknesses is modest and hence still leaves a significant net negative effect of internal control weakness 
on accrual quality, consistent with the OLS regression analysis. Thus, our recursive path analysis also 
suggests that the disclosures are credible.  The overall negative net effect suggests that the substitution 
effect is incomplete, consistent with the view of regulators. This constitutes per se evidence justifying 
some form of internal control disclosure for investors. 
SOX North was motivated by having a large number of relatively “small cap” firms on the two 
Canadian stock exchanges, thus searching for a cost effective method of providing enhanced integrity at 
lower cost than the SOX 404 regime. Among the implications of our research is that if other international 
jurisdictions are searching for alternatives to SOX 404 like regimes, our evidence regarding credibility 
would suggest that there is some benefit to unaudited disclosures that are subject to Audit Committee and 
Board approval. This is an important result, since the concern with noncompliant SOX 302 disclosures is 
evident in both the regulatory literature (see SEC Release Number 33-8934 published in June of 2008) 
and the academic literature (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Gong, Ke, and Yu 2007).   
There are limitations to our research. We assume that audit fees fully capture any change in audit 
effort while we know that fees reflect other factors as well. We also have all the limitations that are 
standard when assuming the discretionary accruals models capture accrual quality. This concern is 
mitigated in our research by finding consistent results across different accrual models.  Finally, we 
assume that internal control systems are stable over the 2001- 2006 period. This internal control stability 
assumption is common to the SOX 302/404 literature and hence any biases are likely to be similar. 
Indeed, given the uncertainty surrounding passage and implementation of 52-109, changes to controls in 
expectation of such regulatory change are potentially less likely than in the SOX environment.  
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Overall, the finding that SOX North disclosures are effective provides some comfort to non-US 
regulators that SOX 404 approach is not the only way to gain improved financial reporting quality. 
Whether these benefits could be achieved in other international settings with different institutional 
arrangements than Canada remains to be seen.  The 2008 enhancements to SOX North to include 
implementation effectiveness testing provide an opportunity for future researchers to determine whether 
design tests alone provide most of the benefit from internal control effectiveness disclosures.  
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Appendix 1. Canadian internal control disclosures examples under 52-109 
 
Example 1:  Aeaon Group  
Internal Control over Financial Reporting 
As at the financial year ended December 31, 2006, the Chief Executive Officer and Chief 
Financial Officer evaluated the design of the Company’s internal control over financial reporting. Based 
on that evaluation, the Chief Executive Officer and the Chief Financial Officer concluded that the design 
of internal control over financial reporting was effective as at December 31, 2006 to provide reasonable 
assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for 
external purposes in accordance with Canadian GAAP. 
There have been no changes in the Company’s internal control over financial reporting that 
occurred during the most recent interim period ended December 31, 2006 that have materially affected, or 
are reasonably likely to materially affect, the Company’s internal control over financial reporting. 
 
Example 2:  Gendis Inc.   
The Chief Executive Officer and the Chief Financial Officer have concluded, based on their 
evaluations, that the Corporation’s disclosure controls and procedures are sufficiently effective to provide 
reasonable assurance that material information has been disclosed in the Corporation’s annual filings for 
the year ended January 31, 2007. 
The Chief Executive Officer and the Chief Financial Officer have concluded, based on their 
evaluations, that the Corporation’s internal controls over financial reporting have been sufficiently 
designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the 
preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with the issuer’s Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles with the following identified weaknesses. 
• Effective internal control requires that the functions of authorizing transactions, recording 
transactions, control over the custody of assets and the account reconciliation process be conducted 
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by different personnel.  There are insufficient personnel to accomplish this requirement.  The 
Corporation has a small staff complement of eight employees and accordingly it is impractical to 
achieve proper segregation of incompatible functions in all transaction cycles. 
• The Corporation employs only one individual with the requisite financial skills and competence to 
determine the appropriate critical accounting estimates in accordance with Generally Accepted 
Principles for the compilation of the Corporation’s financial statements.  As a result, the 
calculations and conclusions are not independently verified by other personnel in two critical 
accounting processes, namely: 
1. The determination of the accounting and disclosure of the investment balances and income from 
flow-through entities investment and 
2. The determination of the accounting for the income tax provision, balances and related ancillary 
note disclosure. 
The limited staff complement requires that the Company’s senior management actively participate 
in most aspects of each transaction cycle.  Consequently there is an inherent risk of management 
overriding controls and procedures.  The nature of an internal control exception from the lack of 
segregation of incompatible functions could be so pervasive that a material error could occur and not be 
detected on a timely basis in any transaction cycle.  Also, the lack of independent verification of the two 
critical accounting processes noted above could result in a material error in investment balances, income 
from flow-through entities investments, the income tax provision, tax balances and related ancillary note 
disclosure not being detected on a timely basis. 
Potential solutions to these internal exceptions would ordinarily involve hiring additional staff or 
engaging independent qualified accountants on a consulting basis.  At this time, the Board of Directors 
has determined that these remedies are not cost effective in relation to the risk of material misstatement. 
The Chairman, President & Chief Executive Officer and the Vice President, Finance & Comptroller 
have filed certificates in SEDAR as required under Multilateral Instrument 52-316 regarding assertions on 
material facts, assertions on the fair presentation of the Company’s financial statements, 
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acknowledgements on the design and effectiveness of disclosure controls and procedures, and 
acknowledgements on the design of internal control over financial reporting. 
The Company’s Independent Auditors have reported to shareholders, based on Canadian Generally 
Accepted Auditing Standards, their opinion on the fair presentation of the Company’s financial statements 
in accordance with Canadian Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. 
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Appendix 2. Variable definitions 
Variable Names Definitions and Estimations 
 
Dependent (or path) variables  
Audit Fee Logarithm of total audit fee for the fiscal year 2006. 
BSAQ The average of the absolute value of the residuals from the 
Dechow and Dichev model modified by McNichols (2002), 
Francis et al. (2005), and Ball and Shivakumar (2006). The 
measure is estimated in cross section from 2001-2006 by Fama-
French industries and by year.  
DDAAQ The average of the absolute value of the residuals from the 
Dechow and Dichev accrual quality measure, estimated in cross 
section from 2001-2006 by Fama-French industries and by year.  
Num ICW Number of internal control weakness self-reported by the firm 
in its Management Discussion & Analysis (MD&A). Collected 
by hand from annual reports.  
 
Control variables 
 
Abnormal NPAP Abnormal number of professional accountants. The residuals of 
the regression of the logarithm of the number of professional 
accountants on the measures of firm size, risk, and complexity.  
Audit committee score Audit committee quality score is a linear composite score for 
compliance with best practices recommended by the Canadian 
Securities Administrator (CSA 2004). Examples are: All 
members of the committee are independent, financially literate, 
etc. Collected by hand from proxy statements. 
Age The logarithm of the number of years that the firm is publicly 
traded.  
Assets Logarithm of total assets at the end of fiscal year 2006. 
Auditor Big-4 auditor indicator variable.   
Auditor change An indicator variable, “1” if there is a change in auditor in fiscal 
year 2006 compared to the prior year, “0” otherwise. 
Board of directors score Board of directors quality score is a linear composite score for 
compliance with best practices recommended by the Canadian 
Securities Administrators (NP 58-101 and 58-201). Examples 
are: Is the chair of the board not the CEO or President, is the 
Compensation Committee made up of non-management and a 
majority of independent directors, etc. Collected by hand from 
proxy statements. 
Book-to-market ratio Book to Market ratio. Book value divided by the market value 
at the end of fiscal year 2006. 
CF volatility The standard deviation of cash from operations (Compustat data 
item #308), scaled by average assets, from 2001–2005. 
Current assets Current Assets divided by total assets 
Financial industry dummy Financial industry indicator variable; “1” if financial firms, “0” 
otherwise. 
Foreign transactions 
dummy 
An indicator variable which equals “1” if the firm has a non-
zero foreign currency translation in fiscal year 2006, and “0” 
otherwise.  
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Inventory Inventory scaled by total assets at the end of fiscal year 2006. 
Inventory & Receivables Account Receivable and Inventory scaled by total assets at the 
end of fiscal year 2006.  
Leverage Long term debt plus short term debt divided by total assets. 
Loss An indicator variable; “1” if the average of earnings before 
extraordinary items in fiscal years 2005 and 2006 is negative, 
“0”, otherwise. 
Num of business segments The number of business segments collected from the financial 
statements.  
Num of geographic 
segments 
The number of geographic segments collected from the 
financial statements.  
Restatement An indicator variable, “1” if the company has at least one 
earnings restatement due to errors or the change of estimates 
involving the four fiscal years preceding fiscal year 2006, “0” 
otherwise. 
Return on assets Net income divided by total assets. 
Sales volatility The standard deviation of sales (Compustat data item #12), 
scaled by average assets from 2001–2005 
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TABLE 1 
Internal control regulatory requirements: Canada U.S. comparison 
 
  
US Accelerated Filers 
 
US Non-Accelerated 
Filers 
 
Canadian TSX 
companies 
Assess design  effectiveness 
of internal controls 
Quarterly after August 
14, 2003 (SOX 302)   
Quarterly from 2003 
(SOX 302) 
Year ends after June 
29, 2006 
 
Effectiveness of 
Implementation of Internal 
Controls 
 
Quarterly after August 
14, 2003 (SOX 302) 
 
Quarterly from 2003 to 
date (SOX 302) 
 
Quarterly after 
December 15, 2008 
(52-109, revised 2008) 
 
Management certification of 
evaluation of ICOFR 
 
Year ends and quarterly 
after June 15, 2004 (SOX 
404 Part a) 
 
Year ends and 
quarterly after 
December 15, 2007 
(SOX 404 Part a) 
 
Year ends and 
quarterly after 
December 15, 2008 
(52-109, revised 2008) 
 
Audit of ICOFR 
 
Year ends after June 15, 
2004 (SOX 404 Part b) 
 
Year ends after June 
15, 2010  (SOX 404 
Part b) 
 
N/A* 
 
Notes: *CSA (2006a) documents the proposal to require in Canada an audit of the effectiveness of internal controls 
over financial reporting.  This proposal was dropped as part of the compromise that allowed management 
assessment of internal control to proceed. 
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TABLE 2 
Sample selection and descriptive statistics  
 
Panel A:  Sample selection  
  Number of Observations 
(1) Active Canadian firms in Compustat data file in 2006.    1,230 
(2) No missing value for internal control weaknesses and other 
control variables in 2006.  826 
(3) No missing value for accrual quality, cash flow volatility, 
sales volatility (require multiple years information).              603 
(4) Excluding 133 firms cross-listed in U.S. 
      Final  sample:  470 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics 
 Mean Q1 Median Q3 Std Dev 
Accrual Quality (DDAAQ) 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.06 
Audit fee 12.24 11.49 12.16 12.87 1.12 
Num ICW 0.49 0 0 0 1.02 
Abnormal NPAP 0.04 -0.45 0.09 0.61 0.94 
Audit committee score 9.49 10 10 10 2.21 
Age 14.20 8 12 20 8.02 
Assets 5.38 4.09 5.46 6.73 1.95 
Auditor 0.78 1 1 1 0.42 
Auditor change 0.07 0 0 0 0.26 
Board of directors score 22.21 18 26 30 11.63 
Book-to-market ratio 0.54 0.29 0.48 0.76 3.21 
CF volatility 0.19 0.001 0.003 0.01 3.25 
Current assets 0.38 0.14 0.33 0.59 0.27 
Financial industry dummy 0.14 0 0 0 0.35 
Foreign transactions dummy 0.50 0 1 1 0.50 
Inventory 0.07 0 0.01 0.12 0.12 
Inventory & Receivables 0.21 0.04 0.14 0.33 0.22 
Leverage 0.24 0.03 0.19 0.35 0.30 
Loss 0.33 0 0 1 0.47 
Num of business segments 1.12 0 0 2 1.58 
Num of geographic segments 1.36 0 0 2 1.75 
Restatement 0.13 0 0 0 0.33 
Return on assets -0.05 -0.02 0.04 0.08 0.47 
Sales volatility 0.08 0.002 0.01 0.05 0.28 
Notes:  See Appendix 2 for variable definitions. 
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TABLE 3 
Pearson correlation matrix 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 V10 V11 
V2: Audit fee -0.173           
V3: Num ICW 0.138 -0.025          
V4: Abnormal NPAP -0.053 0.141 -0.062         
V5: Audit committee score -0.087 0.148 -0.025 -0.044        
V6: Age -0.167 0.170 -0.077 0.175 0.004       
V7: Assets -0.357 0.698 -0.161 -0.019 0.106 0.164      
V8: Auditor -0.090 0.188 -0.091 0.033 0.036 -0.032 0.295     
V9: Auditor change 0.048 -0.128 0.087 -0.027 -0.037 -0.002 -0.175 -0.025    
V10: Board of directors score -0.189 0.344 -0.054 0.037 0.328 0.068 0.349 0.175 -0.126   
V11: Book-to-market ratio 0.003 0.019 -0.032 0.030 0.009 0.089 0.035 0.072 -0.004 0.017  
V12: CF volatility 0.060 -0.004 -0.025 -0.050 0.011 -0.029 -0.028 0.026 0.001 -0.033 -0.003 
V13: Current assets 0.305 -0.126 0.074 0.008 -0.014 0.002 -0.481 -0.265 0.092 -0.108 -0.019 
V14: Financial industry dummy -0.038 -0.015 -0.109 -0.037 -0.082 0.003 0.201 0.015 -0.001 -0.049 -0.122 
V15: Foreign transactions dummy 0.092 0.027 0.122 -0.078 0.011 -0.075 -0.165 0.035 0.103 -0.091 -0.026 
V16: Inventory 0.103 0.163 0.101 -0.054 0.037 0.113 -0.036 -0.079 0.030 -0.042 0.020 
V17: Inventory & Receivables 0.188 0.164 0.110 -0.061 0.057 0.063 -0.089 -0.128 0.010 -0.014 0.006 
V18: Leverage -0.013 0.073 -0.013 0.001 0.066 0.031 0.070 -0.063 0.018 -0.051 -0.113 
V19: Loss 0.134 -0.247 0.094 -0.075 -0.073 -0.078 -0.419 -0.198 0.201 -0.116 -0.010 
V20: Num of business segments 0.010 0.374 0.086 0.018 0.078 0.147 0.272 0.111 -0.036 0.079 0.074 
V21: Num of geographic segments 0.045 0.246 0.102 0.009 0.057 0.054 0.070 -0.033 0.016 0.095 0.043 
V22: Restatement 0.053 0.018 0.111 -0.027 -0.004 -0.001 -0.068 -0.073 0.061 -0.028 0.077 
V23: Return on assets -0.317 0.249 -0.048 -0.028 0.059 0.075 0.422 0.095 -0.128 0.133 0.033 
V24: Sales volatility 0.257 -0.100 0.001 0.044 -0.002 -0.034 -0.168 -0.060 -0.027 -0.024 -0.016 
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TABLE 3 (Cont.) 
 
 V12 V13 V14 V15 V16 V17 V18 V19 V20 V21 V22 V23 
V13: Current assets -0.010            
V14: Financial industry dummy -0.023 -0.236           
V15: Foreign transactions dummy 0.039 0.171 -0.270          
V16: Inventory -0.029 0.404 -0.185 0.129         
V17: Inventory & Receivables -0.041 0.555 -0.069 0.060 0.680        
V18: Leverage -0.008 -0.214 0.223 -0.102 -0.063 0.010       
V19: Loss 0.079 0.192 -0.170 0.180 -0.070 -0.107 0.006      
V20: Num of business segments -0.039 0.000 -0.046 0.098 0.151 0.103 0.044 -0.184     
V21: Num of geographic segments 0.014 0.164 -0.182 0.279 0.153 0.161 -0.042 0.062 0.306    
V22: Restatement -0.021 -0.019 -0.030 0.061 0.019 -0.017 0.005 0.061 0.004 0.005   
V23: Return on assets -0.038 -0.196 0.095 -0.063 0.035 0.033 -0.088 -0.427 0.096 0.029 0.021  
V24: Sales volatility -0.007 0.170 -0.080 0.006 0.129 0.169 0.057 -0.047 0.052 0.027 -0.027 -0.007 
 
Notes: See Appendix 2 for variable definitions.  
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TABLE 4 
Effect of internal control weaknesses on accrual quality: OLS and two-stage regression  
 
  OLS regression Two-stage regression 
 Predicted Sign Coeff t-stat  Coeff t-stat  
Intercept  0.1054 
  
10.48 0.0870 ***      5.38 ***  
Num ICW + 0.0043 1.84  **       
Predicted Num ICW +    0.0234 1.75 
Assets 
**     
- -0.0068 -4.68 -0.0050 ***   -2.55 
Num of business segments 
***   
+ 0.0030 1.93 0.0018 **      0.96       
CF volatility + 0.0009 1.26  0.0011 1.50 
Sales volatility 
  * 
+ 0.0413 4.87 0.0438 ***  5.06 
Age 
***  
- -0.0008 -2.69 -0.0007 *** -2.13 
Loss 
** 
+ -0.0077 -1.34 -0.0090 *         -1.54 
Return on assets 
*         
- -0.0284 -4.99 -0.0301 ***    -5.17 
Foreign transactions 
***    
+ 0.0023 0.48  -0.0005 -0.11  
Adjusted R  2 22.35%  22.30% 
 
Notes: See Appendix 2 for variable definitions.  Predicted Num ICW is estimated using ordinal probit model 
including all variables in the internal control weakness equation and the exogenous variables in the second stage 
regression.  *, **, and *** represents statistical significance at a one-tailed 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level. 
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TABLE 5   
Fit summary for recursive path analysis 
 
Goodness of fit criteria  
CFI* 0.927 
IFI* 0.929 
RMESA** 0.040 (p>0.99) 
χ2 351.00, 0.0001  , p-value*** 
χ2 1.76 /df**** 
When model estimated using asymptotic 
distribution assumptions:   
             GFI***** 0.999 
             AGFI***** 0.999 
 
Notes: * CFI (comparative fit index) with 0.90 and above being a moderately good fit (Chau 1997). Thompson 
(2000) advocates a tighter standard for constructed scales (i.e. experimental or survey scales) of 0.95 and above. 
However we are using archival data that is inherently noisier compared to measures gathered in controlled 
experiments and surveys as the experimenter can directly design both the number and types of measurements taken. 
Archival researchers must use data that is in the public domain and is not custom crafted to suit the research 
questions of interest.  Bollen (1989b) developed an earlier fit index called the IFI (incremental fit index) where 
values approaching 1 are considered excellent fits and values over 0.90 are adequate fits. 
 
** RMSEA (root mean square error approximation) with 0.05 being a very good fit and anything below 0.06 
representing an acceptable fit (Thompson 2000).  The p-value in bracket is a test of the null hypotheses that p=0.05 
and is based on a simulated distribution of RMSEA values. Other authors argue that anything less than .08 is 
acceptable for archival data (Chau 1997). 
 
*** While a highly significant test result may be intuitively thought of as good, in fact in structural modeling the 
opposite is true.  The goal is to test the null hypotheses that no improvement in the model fit is possible; hence one 
does not want to reject the null.  However, the χ2 test is highly sensitive to sample size. Brannick (1995, p205) states 
that “with large samples, it is extremely rare to find a nonsignificant chi-square.”  Our sample falls into the category 
of moderately large to large compared to samples typically employed using structural equations modeling.  Hence, 
the finding of significant values for the χ2
 
 test is not surprising.   
**** An alternative test to deal with the sensitivity of the χ2 test to large sample size. The test divides χ2
 
 by degrees 
of freedom, with anything less than 3.0 being cited from simulation studies as indicating a good fit (Chau 1997). 
***** Jöreskog and Sörbom (1984) developed GFI (goodness of fit index) for structural equations models.  Models 
that approach 1 are considered to have a good fit.  The AGFI (adjusted goodness of fit index) is a modification to the 
GFI that considers the number of degrees of freedom in the model.  Again, good fit is indicated by models that 
approach 1. 
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TABLE 6 
Results for recursive path analysis 
 
Panel A: Audit fee equation  
 Audit Fee = β0 +β1NumICW + β2Assets +β3 Inventory&Receivables +β4
+β
Current assets  
5Num of business segments +β6Num of geographic segments +β7
+ β
Book-to-market ratio  
8Leverage +β9Return on assets +β10Auditor +β11
 
Financial industry dummy + ε             
Pred. Sign Unstandardized coefficient 
Num ICW H2 + 0.059** 
Assets + 0.454
Inventory &Receivables 
*** 
+ 0.668
Current assets 
*** 
+ 0.590
Num of business segments  
*** 
+ 0.076
Num of geographic segments 
*** 
+ 0.059
Book-to-market ratio 
*** 
- -0.009 
Leverage + 0.247
Return on assets 
** 
- -0.119
Auditor 
* 
+ 0.027 
Financial industry dummy ? -0.350
 
*** 
 
Squared Multiple Correlation (SMC) 61.0% 
 
Panel B: Internal control weakness equation 
NumICW =β0+β1Assets+β2Age +β3Num of business segments +β4Loss +β5Foreign transactions + β6Inventory + 
β7Audit committee score +β8Abnormal NPAP +β9Restatment + β10Auditor +β11
 
Auditor change + ε           
    
Pred. Sign Unstandardized coefficient 
Assets - -0.070*** 
Age - -0.009
Num of business segments 
* 
+ 0.082
Loss 
*** 
+ 0.044 
Foreign transactions + 0.128
Inventory 
* 
+ 0.590
Audit committee score 
* 
- -0.011 
Abnormal NPAP - -0.039 
Restatement + 0.270
Auditor 
** 
- -0.104 
Auditor change + 0.189 
       
Squared Multiple Correlation (SMC) 5.1% 
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Panel C: Accrual quality equation  
     DDAAQ = β0 +β1Audit Fee + β2Num ICW + β3Age + β4CF volatility +β5
+β
Sales volatility  
6Audit committee score + β7
      
Board of directors score + ε              
 Pred. Sign Unstandardized coefficient 
Audit Fee H3 - -0.005
Num ICW 
** 
H1 + 0.007
Age 
*** 
- -0.001
CF volatility 
*** 
+ 0.001
Sales volatility 
* 
+ 0.043
Audit committee score 
*** 
- -0.001 
Board of directors score - -0.000
 
** 
 
Squared Multiple Correlation (SMC) 6.80% 
 
Notes: See Appendix 2 for variable definitions. Unstandardized coefficient values are reported for all variables. See 
Figure 2 for standardized coefficients.  *, ** and *** represents statistical significance at a one tailed 10%, 5% and 
1% level, respectively. Squared Multiple Correlation (SMC) is a pseudo R-squared measure capturing the extent of 
the variation explained by the recursive model (Arbuckle and Wothke 1999). 
49 
 
TABLE 7 
Results for non-recursive (bi-directional) path analysis 
 
Panel A: Audit fee equation  
AuditFee = β0 +β1DDAAQ+ β2Num ICW +β3Assets +β4
+β
Inventory& Receivables 
5Current assets +β6Num of business segments+β7
+ β
Num of geographic segments 
8Book-to-marktet ratio+β9Leverage +β10Return on assets +β11
β
Auditor + 
12
 
Financial industry dummy + ε            
Pred. Sign Unstandardized coefficient 
DDAAQ  + 2.963*** 
Num ICW H2 + 0.154
Assets 
*** 
+ 0.488
Inventory & Receivables 
 *** 
+ 0.521
Current assets 
*** 
+ 0.589
Num of business segments 
*** 
+ 0.060
Num of geographic segments 
*** 
+ 0.052
Book-to-market ratio 
*** 
- -0.008 
Leverage + 0.261
Return on assets 
** 
- -0.045 
Auditor + 0.025 
Financial industry dummy ? -0.365
 
*** 
  
 
Panel B: Internal control weakness equation  
NumICW = β0+β1DDAAQ+β2Audit Fee +β3Age +β4Num of business segments+β5
+β
Loss    
6Foreign transactions + β7Inventory +β8Audit committee score +β9Abnormal NPAP +β10Restatment + 
β11Auditor +β12
   
Auditor change + ε   
 Pred. Sign Unstandardized  coefficient 
DDAAQ - -7.995*** 
Audit Fee - -0.349
Age 
*** 
- -0.016
Num of business segments 
*** 
+ 0.149
Loss 
*** 
+ 0.127 
Foreign transactions + 0.220
Inventory 
** 
+ 1.466
Audit committee score 
*** 
- -0.014 
Abnormal NPAP - 0.023 
Restatement + 0.376
Auditor 
** 
- -0.104 
Auditor change + 0.128 
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Panel C: Accrual quality equation  
DDAAQ = β0 +β1 Audit Fee +β2Num ICW +β3Age +β4CF volatility +β5 Sales volatility +β6Audit committee score 
+β7
        
Board of directors score + ε     
 Pred. Sign Unstandardized coefficient 
Audit Fee H3 - -0.009*** 
Num ICW H1 + 0.027
Age 
*** 
- -0.001
CF volatility 
* 
+ 0.001
Sales volatility 
* 
+ 0.042
Audit committee score 
*** 
- -0.001 
Board of directors score - 0.000 
   
 
Panel D: Goodness of fit criteria 
CFI 0.937 
IFI 0.940 
RMESA 0.037 (p>0.99) 
χ2 327.21, 0.0001  , p-value 
χ2 1.653 /df 
Stability Index 0.30 # 
When model estimated using asymptotic 
distribution assumptions:   
             GFI 0.999 
             AGFI 0.999 
 
 
Notes: The table presents results for a non-recursive path analysis. See Appendix 2 for variable definitions. 
Unstandardized coefficient values are reported for all variables including the path variables (Audit Fee, Num ICW, 
and DDAAQ).  *, ** and *** represents statistical significance at a one tailed 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
SMC computations in AMOS are not reliable in the case of non-recursive models and hence are not reported 
(Arbuckle and Wothke 1999 and see also http://www.amosdevelopment.com/support/faq/how_compute_smc.htm 
assessed on June 4, 2010).  Further there is controversy in the literature about how to compute them in the cases of 
non-recursive models (e.g., Bentler and Raykov 2000). 
# Stability index indicates whether a non-recursive model has a reliable solution.  Values range from negative to 
positive infinity with values ranging from -1 to positive 1 considered acceptable and the closer to 0 the better 
(Arbuckle and Wothke 1999). 
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TABLE 8   
Standardized coefficients for BSAQ path models robustness check 
 
Panel A: Recursive analysis 
Num ICW  --- BSAQ 0.091
Num ICW  --- Audit Fee 
 ** 
0.046
Audit Fee --- BSAQ 
* 
-0.087
 
** 
Model fit: 
CFI = 0.928,  
IFI = 0.930,  
RMSEA=0.040 (p>0.99), 
X2
 
(182)=1.744 (p<0.001) 
Panel B: Non-recursive analysis  
Num ICW  --- BSAQ 0.388
Num ICW  --- Audit Fee 
*** 
0.115
Audit Fee --- BSAQ 
*** 
-0.193
BSAQ  --- Num ICW 
*** 
 -0.324
BSAQ --- Audit Fee 
*** 
  0.139
Audit Fee --- Num ICW 
*** 
    -0.273
 
*** 
Model fit: 
CFI = 0.999,  
IFI=0.999,  
RMSEA=0.043 (p>0.96), 
X2
Stability Index =0.186. 
(198)=1.850 (p<0.001),  
 
 
Notes: The table presents the standardized path coefficients with DDAAQ replaced by BSAQ, and alternative accrual 
quality measure. See Appendix 2 for variable definitions and Figure 1 for predicted signs. Model fit statistics are 
defined in Table 5. *, ** and *** represents statistical significance at a one tailed 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively.   
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Figure 1  This figure illustrates recursive path analysis (solid lines) models as well as non-recursive (bi-directional 
indicated by the solid and dashed lines) path analysis. Each hypothesis is represented by a solid directional arrow 
with the sign in parenthesis reflecting the expected directional relationship following the hypothesis number.  In all 
cases, the higher accrual quality term in the hypotheses has an inverse relationship with DDAAQ. 
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Overall positive net effect: 0.136 – 0.098*0.053 = 0.131. 
 
Figure 2  Recursive (unidirectional) path analysis with standardized path coefficients 
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